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I. Introduction
In Maryland v. Wilson,' the United States Supreme Court crafted an
absolute prerogative for police to order all passengers out of lawfully stopped
vehicles.2 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, characterized
the Court's action as nothing more than an extension of Pennsylvania v.
Mimms's3 rule enabling officers to order, as a matter of course, drivers to exit
their cars.' On the surface, the Wilson Court's ruling seems underwhelming:
sevenjustices all agreed to slightly expand a rule so unremarkable that it origi-
nated in a per curiam opinion not even meriting oral argument.5 Indeed, a
commentator suggested that Attorney General Janet Reno (who argued for the
United States as amicus curiae) chose to argue this case in part because of its
"minimal risk of loss."6 However, a more penetrating analysis of the Court's
* Associate Professor, Division of Political Science and Criminal Justice, California
State University Fullerton; Former Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles, California; J.D.,
1987, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., 1983, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
2. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 884 (1997).
3. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
4. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886; Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977).
5. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 11; see State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d
1, 4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (describing Mimms as "a six page, unsigned opinion explaining
a summary disposition reached without benefit of oral argument"), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 882(1997).
6. Periscope: Reno Goes to Supremes, NEWswEEK, Sept. 9, 1996, at 6, 6. Newsweek
reported:
Attorney General Janet Reno plans to argue her first - and perhaps last - case
before the Supreme Court this fall. After Justice Officials scoured the docket for
1419
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1419 (1997)
new rule exposes stark fallacies in the Court's reasoning and potentially
dangerous consequences stemming from its logic.
The per se right Wilson gives police tears a hole in the fabric of the pro-
tections that the Fourth Amendment guarantees.7 Among its safeguards, this
amendment forbids any unreasonable seizure of the person. Further, at the
time of the Fourth Amendment's adoption, the reasonableness ofwarrantless
searches and seizures was measured by the existence of probable cause as the
threshold level of individualized suspicion needed for official intrusion.' Yet,
the Wilson Court turned a blind eye to this constitutional history. Its decision
allows officers to detain hapless passengers for no reason whatsoever,
whenever the vehicle they occupy is legally stopped.
a simple issue requiring little preparation and posing minimal risk of loss, Reno has
all but settled on a search-and-seizure case involving a police officer's right to order
a passenger out of a car...
Id.
7. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
againstunreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Md.
8. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925) (requiring that probable
cause exist for search of automobiles believed to be transporting contraband liquor). In Carroll,
the Court stated:
On reason and authority the true rule is that if the search and seizure without a
warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out
of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle
contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and
seizure are valid. The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what
was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a
manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of
individual citizens.
Id. at 149; see also Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386,2398 (1995) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). In Acton, Justice O'Connor offered the following interpretation of Carroll:
The [Carroll] Court also held, however, that a warrantless car search was unreason-
able unless supported by some level of individualized suspicion, namely probable
cause. Significantly, the Court did not base its conclusion on the express probable
cause requirement contained in the Warrant Clause, which, as just noted, the Court
found inapplicable. Rather, the Court rested its views on "what was deemed an
unreasonable search and seizure when [the Fourth Amendment] was adopted" and
"[what] will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individ-
ual citizens."
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149).
1420
WILSON'S PER SE SEIZURE PREROGATIVE
Carving out such a free zone for official discretion was no small feat.
The Supreme Court has recognized the privacy value protected by the Fourth
Amendment - the "right to be let alone" - as among the most crucial to a free
society.9 Nearly half a century ago, Justice Jackson admonished:
[Fourth Amendment rights] are not mere second-class rights but belong in
the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations ofrights, none
is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual
and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one
of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary
government.'0
The Wilson Court, in establishing a per se privilege for officers to seize pas-
sengers without any individualized justification, has opened the door to the
kind of "uncontrolled search and seizure" denounced by Justice Jackson. Of
course, Chief Justice Rehnquist might view the "additional intrusion" of
having a passenger exit a vehicle to be of little consequence." Yet, it is an
intrusion. The Fourth Amendment, in prohibiting all unreasonable seizures,
should require reasoned justification for any seizure, no matter how insignifi-
cant.'" The ability to order innocent passengers out of cars without reason is
therefore the very antithesis of the Fourth Amendment.
In Part II, this Article reviews the erosion of individualized suspicion as
a bulwark of personal security in Fourth Amendment Supreme Court juris-
prudence. Part III critically examines Wilson's creation of law enforcement's
absolute right to order any passenger out of a lawfully stopped vehicle.
Finally, Part IV explores the logical inconsistencies and the dangerous conse-
quences of the Wilson Court's curtailment of Fourth Amendment security for
the person.
9. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). This "right to be let alone"
has been deemed "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men." Id. One commentator asserts: "There is, perhaps, no aspect of criminal jurisprudence
more important than that which governs the decision to deprive an individual of his or her
freedom of movement prior to adjudication of guilt or innocence." Richard A. Williamson,
The Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of"Stop" and "Arrest," 43 OHio ST. L.J. 771, 771
(1982).
10. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949).
11. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 886 (1997). Chief Justice Rehnquist deter-
mined that "the additional intrusion on the passenger [in being ordered out of the car] is mini-
mal." Id.
12. See id. at 890 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In dissent, Justice Kennedy explained that
"[i]f a person is to be seized, a satisfactory explanation for the invasive action ought to be
established by an officer who exercises reasoned judgment under all the circumstances of the
case." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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I. The Devolution of the Individualized Suspicion Standard for
Seizures of Motorists
Until recently, the Supreme Court accepted the simple axiom that Fourth
Amendment seizures must be based on specific grounds.13 Carroll v. United
States,4 a prohibition era case, demonstrated this fundamental premise. 5 The
Carroll Court, in approving a warrantless stop and search of an automobile for
intoxicating liquor, created the automobile exception to the warrant require-
ment.16 Even though it thus broadened governmental search and seizure
rights, the Court explicitly denounced any rule providing officials with an
absolute right of search and seizure of motorists:
It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were
authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor and
thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience
and indignity of such a search .... [T]hose lawfully within the country,
entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without
interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official author-
ized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying
contraband or illegal merchandise.
17
Thus, in 1925 the Court mandated that any seizure and search of a vehicle be
justified by circumstances creating suspicion in the individual case. Further,
the level ofjustification required before a vehicle's "free passage" could even
be "interrupted," or seized, was that of probable cause, now the highest level
of suspicion applied to street encounters.18
For decades, the Court continued its adherence to the probable cause
requirement for seizure of motorists and search of their cars, despite its
cost to law enforcement. 9 Indeed, when confronted in Di Re v. United
13. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153-54. The specific grounds requirement did have some
traditional, narrowly tailored exceptions. For instance, all persons could be stopped at
international borders without formation of individualized suspicion: "Travellers [sic] may be
so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably
requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings
as effects which may be lawfully brought in." Id. at 154.
14. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
15. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925).
16. Id. at 149.
17. Id. at 153-54.
18. Id. at 154-56. The Supreme Court decided Carroll in 1925. In Carroll, the Court
applied the only level of suspicion then available, probable cause. .l The "reasonable
suspicion" standard supporting an investigatory detention was established decades later in Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
19. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959); Di Rev. United States,532 U.S.
581,594-95 (1948).
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States"° with the loss of the opportunity to bring criminals to justice, the Court
relied on the original balance of interests struck by the framers:
We meet in this case, as in many, the appeal to necessity. It is said that if
such arrests and searches cannot be made, law enforcement will be more
difficult and uncertain. But the forefathers, after consulting the lessons of
history, designed our Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a too
permeating police surveillance, which they seemed to think was a greater
danger to a free people than the escape of some criminals from punishment.
Taking the law as it has been given to us, this arrest and search were
beyond the lawful authority of those who executed them.2'
A quarter century later, the Court still maintained its probable cause
standard in Brinegar v. United States,22 another case involving the illegal
transportation of alcohol.' In upholding a conviction based on evidence
recovered from an automobile exception search, the Brinegar Court emphat-
ically rejected the notion that "every traveler along the public highways may
be stopped and searched at the officers' whim, caprice or mere suspicion.
'24
Instead, the Court reaffirmed that official intrusion required individualized
suspicion in the form of probable cause.'
The Court's mandatory minimum of probable cause ended with Terry v.
Ohio.26 In Terry, Detective McFadden, a Cleveland Police officer with 39
years of experience, observed three men repeatedly walk past, peer into, and
confer about a particular store window. Suspecting the three of "casing a
job, a stick-up," Detective McFadden approached and identified himself as an
officer.2" The men mumbled responses, causing the detective to grab Terry,
20. 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
21. Di Re v. United States, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
22. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
23. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 177 (1949).
24. Id. at 177.
25. Id. The Brinegar Court reasoned:
In such a case the citizen who has given no good cause for believing he is engaged
in (criminal) activity is entitled to proceed on his way without interference. But one
who recently and repeatedly has given substantial ground for believing that he is
engaging in the forbidden transportation [of alcohol] has no such immunity, if the
officer who intercepts him in that region knows that fact at the time he makes the
interception and the circumstances under which it is made are not such as to
indicate the suspect is going about legitimate affairs.
Id. (footnote omitted).
26. 392 U.S. 1(1968).
27. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1968).
28. Id. at 6-7.
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pat him down, and recover a .38 caliber revolver.29
These facts wedged the Court into a bind. "Unquestionably [Terry] was
entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment as he walked down the
street in Cleveland."3 Yet, equally apparent was Detective McFadden's
need - even in the absence of probable cause - to be able to respond effec-
tively to the potential threat of a dangerous gunman." To extricate the Court
from the front between these warring interests, Chief Justice Warren, writing
for the majority, sought a middle course. He retained the requirement that
police account for their seizures of persons with individualized suspicion;
however, he lessened the level of justification. 2 This compromise meant
abandoning probable cause.
Terry rationalized its dilution of the level of suspicion by suggesting that
the probable cause mandate had relevance only within the warrant context.33
Chief Justice Warren then placed Detective McFadden's actions outside of the
warrant requirement and therefore beyond the boundaries of the explicit
probable cause mandate:
[W]e deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct - necessarily swift
action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the
beat - which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not
be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct involved in
this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures.34
However, even with Terry's recognition of the impracticality of warrants, its
rejection of the probable cause standard, and its serious concern for officer
safety, the Court took great care to maintain the requirement of individualized
suspicion. Chief Justice Warren stated: "[I]njustifying the particular intru-
sion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts
29. Id. at 7.
30. Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
3 1. Id. at 10. The Terry Court recognized that "[o] n the one hand, it is frequently argued
that in dealing with the rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on city streets the
police are in need of an escalating set of flexible responses, graduated in relation to the amount
of information they possess." Id.
32. Id. at 21-22.
33. Id. at 20. The Terry Court asserted: "If this case involved police conduct subject to
the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, we would have to ascertain whether 'probable
cause' existed to justify the search and seizure which took place. However, that is not the case."
Id. This of course, represented a dramatic departure from Carroll, where the Court crafted the
automobile exception to the traditional warrant requirement, as long as police had probable
cause to believe the automobile contained contraband. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
149 (1925).
34. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
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which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion."35
A "reasonable suspicion" standard was necessary for the Fourth Amend-
ment to operate in any practical sense. Police will act most cautiously when
they realize that judges will monitor their behavior. Further, judges can only
truly check police abuse when they are able to assess official conduct by a
measurable standard. Thus, Terry announced:
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it
is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing
the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of ajudge
who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in
light of the particular circumstances.36
Therefore, one of the key ingredients of Fourth Amendment reasonableness
was a specific justification for intrusion. However, the lessened standard of
reasonable suspicion itself suffered potential undermining because the Court
created it in the context of a balancing analysis. Because the Court disre-
garded the warrant and probable cause signposts, it needed some formulato
determine the reasonableness of official intrusion. Terry decided that
reasonableness would be weighed by balancing the government's interests
justifying the intrusion against the individual's interest against invasion."
35. Id. at 21.
36. Id.
37. Later, the Court more directly asserted its conclusion that police may accost an
individual upon a level of suspicion not amounting to probable cause. Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972). In Adams, then Justice Rehnquist characterized Terry as follows:
The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level
of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders
and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recog-
nizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate
response. A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity
or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may
be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.
Id. (citations omitted). In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the Court characterized Terry and
Adams as "together establish[ing] that in appropriate circumstances the Fourth Amendment
allows a properly limited 'search' or 'seizure' on facts that do not constitute probable cause to
arrest orto search for contraband or evidence of crime." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 881 (1975).
38. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21. In Terry, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court,
offered the following analysis:
In order to assess the reasonableness of Officer McFadden's conduct as a general
proposition, it is necessary "first to focus upon the governmental interest which
allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of
the private citizen," for there is "no ready test for determining reasonableness other
1425
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Unfortunately, this balancing approach became too tempting for future
justices to resist.
The 1970s witnessed the full implementation of reasonableness balancing
for vehicle stops. In UnitedStates v. Brignoni-Ponce,39 the Court weighed the
"public interest" against "the individual's right to personal security free from
arbitrary interference by law officers."4 Brignoni-Ponce was a "roving
patrol" case in which Border Patrol agents pulled over a car that was traveling
on a highway near the international border solely because its occupants
"appeared to be of Mexican descent."41 To determine whether the Fourth
Amendment permitted such "random vehicle stops in the border areas,"
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, considered the competing interests
and found that the government's concerns were "valid" but its intrusion on the
individual was merely "modest."'42 Thus, based on the balance of interests,
and particularly "the limited nature of the intrusion," Brignoni-Ponce allowed
roving patrols to stop cars near the border "on facts that do not amount to the
probable cause required for an arrest."43 However, the Court still mandated
that specific facts justifying the intrusion support each stop: "[W]e hold that
when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a partic-
ular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop
the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion."'4
In Brignoni-Ponce, due to the balance of interests in favor of the State,
and the lack of "practical alternatives," the Court was willing to lower the
justification threshold to Terry's reasonable suspicion standard.4' However,
it would go no further. Justice Powell drew the line:
We are unwilling to let the Border Patrol dispense 'entirely with the
requirement that officers must have a reasonable suspicion to justify
roving-patrol stops. In the context ofborder area stops, the reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment demands something more than the
broad and unlimited discretion sought by the Government.46
than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the
search [or seizure] entails."
Id. (quoting Camara v. Municipal Ct, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967)).
39. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
40. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
41. Id. at 874-75.
42. Id. at 879-80.
43. Id. at 880.
44. Id. at 881 (emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 882 (footnote omitted).
1426
WILSON 'S PER SE SEIZURE PREROGATIVE
The reasons behind this stand are particularly interesting. The Brignoni-
Ponce Court expressed concern about the impact that a per se privilege to stop
all vehicles would have on the huge group of innocent motorists. Justice
Powell worried:
To approve roving-patrol stops of all vehicles in the border area, without
any suspicion that a particular vehicle is carrying illegal immigrants, would
subject the residents of these and other areas to potentially unlimited
interference with their use of the highways, solely at the discretion of
Border Patrol officers.47
This "interference" was a concern, despite the fact that the Court considered
it to be relatively minor. After all, the government had assured the justices
that roving patrol seizures typically consume "no more than a minute," involve
no search of the car or its occupants, and entail a visual inspection "limited to
those parts of the vehicle that can be seen by anyone standing alongside.
'48
Thus, even with this modest impact on individual interests, the Court adhered
to its reasonable suspicion mandate.
In the very next term, the Court revisited Fourth Amendment issues
specific to border control in UnitedStates v. Martinez-Fuerte. 9 In Martinez-
Fuerte, Border Patrol officers stopped and briefly questioned motorists at
permanent checkpoints. ° The Border Patrol maintained permanent check-
points, "the most important" part of the nation's inland traffic-checking
operations, near the intersections of important roads leading away from the
border."' Administrators weighed several variables to determine a check-
47. Id. In fact, the Court had gone so far as to crunch the numbers:
Roads near the border carry not only aliens seeking to enter the country illegally,
but a large volume of legitimate traffic as well. San Diego, with a metropolitan
population of 1.4 million, is located on the border. Texas has two fairly large
metropolitan areas directly on the border: El Paso, with a population of 360,000,
and the Brownsville-McAllen area, with a combined population of 320,000. We
are confident that substantially all of the traffic in these cities is lawful and that
relatively few of their residents have any connection with the illegal entry and
transportation of aliens.
Id.
48. Id. at 880. Of course, the Brignoni-Ponce Court could not foresee future decisions
allowing greater visual inspections accompanying police orders for occupants to exit the
vehicles. See Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 884 (1997) (reversing grant of motion to
suppress evidence discovered as passenger existed vehicle); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 107 (1977) (upholding conviction of defendant for carrying concealed weapon, which was
noticed after defendant was ordered out of car he was driving).
49. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
50. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976).
51. Id. at 552, 556.
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point's best placement to detect and limit illegal immigration.52 The per-
manent checkpoint at San Clemente, California, appeared to be typical. It
possessed various indicators of legitimate official authority, such as large
black and yellow signs (i.e., "STOP HERE - U.S. OFFICERS"), flashing
yellow lights, marked Border Patrol vehicles and officers in full dress uni-
form.53 A "point" agent visually screened all vehicles driving through the
checkpoint, bringing them to "a virtual, if not a complete halt." 4 In "a rela-
tively small number of cases," the point agent would direct a car to a "second-
ary inspection area, where their occupants [were] asked about their citizenship
and immigration status."" Neither the visual screening nor the secondary
inspection area referrals were based on any individualized suspicion.
As in Brignoni-Ponce, the Court balanced the competing interests in
Martinez-Fuerte. However, the Martinez-Fuerte Court reached a different
result. Both cases implicated the substantial government interest in control-
ling illegal immigration. However, Martinez-Fuerte's permanent checkpoints
were "far less intrusive" on individual interests than Brignoni-Ponce's roving
patrols. 6 To measure intrusion, Justice Powell bifurcated the analysis of the
impact on the motorist into the "objective intrusion" and the "subjective
intrusion.""1 The objective intrusions of roving patrols and checkpoints, that
of briefly stopping and questioning motorists along with a limited visual
inspection, were essentially the same. 8 The difference arose in the subjective
intrusion, the "generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful
travelers." 9 Roving patrols might "frighten motorists," for they struck at
random, at any time, "day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles of the
2,000-mile border."6 In contrast, a permanent checkpoint, by definition, was
at a fixed location and, therefore, would interfere with motorists' travels only
52. Id. at 553. The administrators considered the following factors:
(i) distant enough from the border to avoid interference with traffic in populated
areas near the border, (ii) close to the confluence of two or more significant roads
leading away from the border, (iii) situated in terrain that restricts vehicle passage
around the checkpoint, (iv) on a stretch of highway compatible with safe operation,
and (v) beyond the 25-mile zone in which "border passes" ... are valid.
Id. (citing United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 406 (S.D. Cal. 1973)).
53. Id. at 545-46 (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 893 (1975)).
54. Id. at 546.
55. Id.




60. Id. at 558-59 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975)).
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once.6' Further, drivers would be forewarned of the checkpoint's approach by
the flashing lights, the orange cones, and other "visible signs of the officers'
authority."6  Moreover, observing other vehicles being stopped in a
regularized manner would reassure those stopped." Perhaps most impor-
tantly, checkpoints lacked the roving patrol's danger of "unreviewable discre-
tion" in stopping cars because the location of the checkpoint vehicle stop was
determined not by the officer in the field, but by administrators who had
previously selected the best location based on a variety of neutral factors."
There was a method to the Court's madness in delving into the contrast-
ing details between roving patrols and checkpoints. Justice Powell, in mini-
mizing the intrusiveness of checkpoints, set the stage for the removal of the
fundamental protection of all travelers: individualized suspicion. Martinez-
Fuerte, in determining permanent checkpoints to be "limited" and even
"reassuring," ultimately held that the checkpoint stops and questioning were
reasonable even in the "absence of any individualized suspicion."'65 The Court
went even further, finding referrals to the secondary inspection areas, although
perhaps annoying, to involve such minimal intrusion as to require "no
particularized reason" for justification.66 Justice Powell acknowledged the
defendants' correct contention that "to accommodate public and private inter-
ests some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a
constitutional search or seizure."67 However, he offered an ominous response:
"But the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such
suspicion.""
Context was crucial in Martinez-Fuerte. Justice Powell jettisoned the
reasonable suspicion requirement in Martinez-Fuerte because he felt check-
points created special circumstances of security for the motorist. Indeed, he
equated certain assurances provided by checkpoints to those given by a search
warrant.69 The Court relied heavily on the particular facts in Martinez-Fuerte
in relieving the government of the traditional individualized suspicion man-
date.70
61. Id. at 559.
62. Id. at 558 (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975)).
63. Id. at 559.
64. Id. (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 557, 559, 562.
66. Id. at 560, 563.
67. Id at 560.
68. Id. at561.
69. Id. at 565.
70. Id at 561. As part of its contextual analysis, the Court contrasted the circumstances
in the case with "the sanctity of private dwellings," noting "one's expectation of privacy in an
1429
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1419 (1997)
The Court applied its balancing analysis outside of the border patrol
context in Pennsylvania v. Mimms.71 In Mimins, two Philadelphia patrol offi-
cers saw Harry Mimms driving a car with an expired license plate.72 The offi-
cers lawfully pulled Mimms over for the purpose of issuing him a traffic
summons and asked him to step out of his vehicle.' When he complied, one
officer noticed a "large bulge" under Mimms' sports jacket and, fearing
Mimms possessed a weapon, performed a Terry frisk.74 During this pat down,
the officer recovered a.3 0 caliberrevolver and immediately arrested Mimms.
The officer ordered Mimms out of the car simply because it was his
"practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course when-
ever they had been stopped for a traffic violation."76 Therefore, the sole issue
was whether police should have the absolute right to order lawfully stopped
drivers to alight from their vehicles.77 To answer this question, the Court
accepted Terry's invitation to balance the competing interests of the govern-
ment and the individual." On the government side of the equation, the Court
opined: "We think it too plain for argument that the State's proffered justifi-
cation - the safety of the officer - is both legitimate and weighty."79 The
Court bolstered its assertion by citing statistics of police shootings that occur
when an officer "approaches a person seated in an automobile" and also by
noting the "hazard of accidental injury from passing traffic to an officer stand-
ing on the driver's side of the vehicle."" In contrast, Mimms deemed the
intrusion on the individual driver as "de minimis."'8 Essential to the Mimms
Court's reasoning was the context ofthe government invasion. Noting that the
police had already lawfully stopped the driver, the Court explained:
automobile and of freedom in its operation are significantly different from the traditional
expectation of privacy and freedom in one's residence." Id. (citations omitted).
71. Pennsylvaniav. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977).




76. Id. at 110. Indeed, the State "freely" conceded that its officer "had no reason to
suspect foul play from the particular driver at the time of the stop, there having been nothing
unusual or suspicious about his behavior." Id. at 109.
77. Id. The Court framed the issue as follows: "[Wie need presently deal only with the
narrow question of whether the order to get out of the car, issued after the driver was lawfully
detained, was reasonable and thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment." Id.
78. Id.
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[T]he only question is whether he shall spend that period sitting in the
driver's seat of his car or standing alongside it. Not only is the insistence
of the police on the latter choice not a "serious intrusion upon the sanctity
of the person," but it hardly rises to the level of a "'petty indignity."'8 2
Thus, the driver, having violated the law, can be lawfully detained. Once
legally within official control, it is of virtually no legal weight that officers
order a driver out of his vehicle. Indeed, the Court seemed almost perturbed
that it was called upon to decide that being lawfully detained outside of a car
was constitutionally no different than suffering through the same stop behind
the wheel. 3
The next term, the Court came across a case meriting greater attention.
In Delaware v. Prouse,4 a New Castle County police officer randomly
stopped Prouse's car."5 Even though the patrol officer witnessed "neither
traffic or equipment violations nor any suspicious activity," the officer seized
the car, as he later explained, because "[he] saw the car in the area and wasn't
answering any complaints, so [he] decided to pull them off." 6 Prouse himself
apparently was a passenger in his own automobile at the time the arresting
officer stopped the car. 7 During the approach, the officer smelled and ulti-
mately seized marijuana, which Prouse later moved to suppress."
At the outset, Justice White, writing for the majority of the Court, readily
recognized that the officer's interference with Prouse's travels constituted a
Fourth Amendment seizure, despite its brevity and limited purpose. 9 Further,
82. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968)).
83. Id.; see State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 1, 4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (noting Mimms
Court disposed of case in per curiam opinion without hearing oral argument), rev'd, 117 S. Ct.
882 (1997). However, the Mimms Court did concede, albeit seemingly begrudgingly, that the
officer's "request" to get out of the car was at least an "incremental intrusion" beyond the initial
stop. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977).
84. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
85. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 650 (1979).
86. Id. at 650-51 (citation omitted).
87. Id. at 650 n.1. The Prouse Court noted:
In its opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court referred to respondent as the operator
of the vehicle. However, the arresting officer testified: "I don't believe [respon-
dent] was the driver... As I recall, he was in the back seat.. ;" and the trial court
in its ruling on the motion to suppress referred to respondent as one of the four
"occupants" of the vehicle. The vehicle was registered to respondent.
Id. (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 650.
89. Id. at 653 (citations omitted). Justice White simply stated: "The Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments are implicated in this case because stopping an automobile and detaining
its occupants constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of those Amendments, even though the
purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Id.
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the Court noted that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard usually
required, "at a minimum, that the facts upon which an intrusion is based be
capable of measurement against 'an objective standard,' whether this be prob-
able cause or a less stringent test."" However, the Prouse Court also ac-
knowledged that in certain situations in the past, the Court had balanced away
this fundamental mandate of individualized suspicion. Generally, the Court
would take such a dramatic step only when other safeguards existed to pre-
serve Fourth Amendment rights.91
Consequently, Justice White balanced the interests to determine whether
the government's random vehicle stops for license and registration checks fell
within this special category of cases. On the government's side, the Court
identified as "vital" the State's interest in promoting public safety on its roads
and recognized "the danger to life and property posed by vehicular traffic
and ... the difficulties that even a cautious and an experienced driver may
encounter."92 Yet, the Prouse Court was not content to measure merely the
magnitude of the government interests at stake. Justice White also weighed
the efficacy offDelaware's program: "The question remains, however, whether
in the service of these important ends the discretionary spot check is a suffi-
ciently productive mechanism to justify the intrusion upon Fourth Amendment
interests which such stops entail."'93 To answer his own query, Justice White
applied some simple logic. He noted that the "foremost method" of promoting
highway safety was "acting upon observed violations."94 Further, unlicenced
motorists were either less safe drivers, or they were not. If those driving
without a valid license were indeed less safe, their dangerous "propensities"
would "exhibit themselves" in their driving, thus enabling officers to detect
them by observation." If, on the other hand, the unlicenced drivers were not
less safe drivers, then the very practice of licensing drivers would itself
90. Id. at 654 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1969)) (footnotes omitted).
91. Id. at 654-55. The Prouse Court noted: "In those situations in which the balance of
interests precludes insistence upon 'some quantum of individualized suspicion,' other safe-
guards are generally relied upon to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy
is not 'subject to the discretion of the official in the field."' Id. (footnote omitted). Embedded
within this assertion was a footnote to Martinez-Fuerte, the case in which the Court suspended
the individualized suspicion requirement in part because the checkpoint itself limited official
discretion. See supra notes 49-70 and accompanying text (discussing Martinez-Fuerte).
Additionally, the Court cited Camara v. Municipal Court, which loosened the probable cause
standard due in part to the restraints on official discretion written into the administrative scheme
of housing inspections. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967).
92. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658 (1979).
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"hardly be an effective means of promoting roadway safety."96 Thus, the most
effective way to catch unlicenced, and therefore presumably unsafe drivers
was simply to look out for them on the highway. In contrast, the state's spot
checks were not "sufficiently productive to qualify as a reasonable law
enforcement practice under the Fourth Amendment.""7
Delaware's program seemed all the more feeble when its indiscriminate
scope was considered: "It seems common sense that the percentage of all
drivers on the road who are driving without a license is very small and that
the number of licensed drivers who will be stopped in order to find one
unlicenced operator will be large indeed."98 Impact on the innocent motorist
became key. When it came to weighing the individual's side of the scales, the
Prouse Court experienced no difficulty in envisioning the effect such a broad
and absolute police prerogative would have on all drivers. Justice White con-
tinued:
The marginal contribution to roadway safety possibly resulting from a sys-
tem of spot checks cannot justify subjecting every occupant of every
vehicle on the roads to a seizure - limited in magnitude compared to other
intrusions but nonetheless constitutionally cognizable - at the unbridled
discretion of law enforcement officials. To insist neither upon an appropri-
ate factual basis for suspicion directed at a particular automobile nor upon
some other substantial and objective standard or rule to govern the exercise
of discretion "would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed
rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches ......
This kind ofstandardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil the Court
has discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of
the official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent.99
96. Id.
97. Id. at 660.
98. Id. at 659-60.
99. Id. at 661 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)). Additionally, perhaps in
answer to earlier statements of the Court minimizing the Fourth Amendment interests of
motorists, Justice White asserted:
Many people spend more hours each day traveling in cars than walking on the
streets. Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of security and privacy in traveling
in an automobile than they do in exposing themselves by pedestrian or other modes
of travel. Were the individual subject to unfettered governmental intrusion every
time he entered an automobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment
would be seriously circumscribed. As Terry v. Ohio... recognized, people are not
shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they step from their homes onto
the public sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of those interests when they step from the
sidewalks into their automobiles.
Id. at 662-63; see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (minimizing
Fourth Amendment interests of motorists).
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In the 1977 and 1978 terms, the Court established a two-step analysis
pertaining to seizures ofmotorists. Prouse forcefully reasserted the traditional
Fourth Amendment limit that officers must justify virtually all traffic stops
with some kind of objective individualized suspicion. However, Mimms
enabled police, having lawfully stopped a vehicle based upon a constitutional
level of suspicion, to automatically demand the driver exit his or her car
without any further justification.
A majority of the Court finally obtained the opportunity to explain the
underpinnings of Mimms in New York v. Class."° In Class, two New York
City police officers pulled Benigno Class over after observing him commit
two traffic violations - speeding and driving with a cracked windshield.''
Class emerged from his car on his own initiative and approached one officer
while the other opened the car door to inspect the Vehicle Identification Num-
ber (VIN) on the doorjamb.0 2 Finding no VIN, the officer reached into the
car to move papers that were blocking the dashboard VIN, causing him to see
a gun sticking out from under the driver's seat.0 3 The officers recovered the
gun and arrested Class.'
In deciding whether the trial judge should have suppressed the gun,
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, isolated two official intrusions:
(1) detaining Class briefly outside of his vehicle after he had chosen to alight
from it, and (2) searching inside the car for the VIN which was necessary only
because of Class's detention outside of the car.105 After all, the officers could
have avoided the search of the car by having Class return to his driver's seat
and by having him remove the papers obscuring the dashboard VIN. How-
ever, demanding such action by police would be contrary to Mimms:
To have returned respondent immediately to the automobile would have
placed the officers in the same situation that the holding in Mimms allows
officers to avoid- permitting an individual being detained to have possible
access to a dangerous weapon and the benefit of the partial concealment
provided by the car's exterior."°
Justice O'Connor therefore had to assess whether the officer's actions in
Class fell within the Mimms automatic privilege. To make this determination,
Justice O'Connor identified three crucial factors: (1) "the safety of the
officers was served by the governmental intrusion," (2) "the intrusion was
100. 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
101. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 107-08 (1986).
102. Id. at 108.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 116.
106. Id.
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minimal," and (3) "the search stemmed from some probable cause focusing
suspicion on the individual affected by the search.""0 7 As to the first variable,
Justice O'Connor found the officer's search for the VIN while keeping the
driver outside the vehicle, presumably to keep him from obtaining access to
a dangerous weapon, was 'justified.' ' " Similarly, the Class court deemed the
intrusion sufficiently minimal to satisfy the second prong because "[tjhe
search was focused in its objective and no more intrusive than necessary to
fulfill that objective."'0 9 The third factor, regarding probable cause, was
easily met: "Indeed, here the officers' probable cause stemmed from directly
observing respondent commit a violation of the law.""11
Class's reliance upon Mimms put the earlier per curiam opinion in an
entirely new light. Justice O'Connor hardly made it easy for future courts to
extend an officer's per se right to order drivers out of lawfully stopped vehi-
cles. Instead, she created three significant hurdles to clear before officers
could intrude on Fourth Amendment protections without first establishing
some kind of individualized suspicion."'
In 1990, the Court returned to the suspicionless checkpoint stops it had
previously considered in Martinez-Fuerte. In Michigan Department ofState
Police v. Sitz,"' Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that
Michigan's sobriety checkpoint program did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.' In Sitz, a Sobriety Check Point Advisory Committee established
guidelines for checkpoint operations, site selection, and publicity." 4 Pursuant
to the Committee's procedures, officers stopped all vehicles passing though
107. Id. at 117-18.
108. The Class Court opined: "IThe governmental interest in highway safety served by
obtaining the VIN is of the first order, and the particular method of obtaining the VIN here was
justified by a concern for the officers' safety." Id. at 118. Additionally, the Court noted: "In
light of the danger to the officers' safety that would have been presented by returning
respondent immediately to his car, we think the search to obtain the VIN was not prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 116.
109. Id. at 118.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 117-18.
112. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
113. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990).
114. Id. The site selection committee in Sitz had the same administrative nature as that in
Martinez-Fuerte: "The director appointed a Sobriety Checkpoint Advisory Committee com-
prising representatives of the State Police force, local police forces, state prosecutors, and the
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute." Id. Likewise, it is likely that, as it
was inMarlinez-Fuerte, the members ofSitz's committee lacked the temptation typically facing
the officer on the beat to expand his or her search and seizure authority. See United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) (assuming administrators would be "unlikely to
locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class").
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a sobriety checkpoint while the drivers were briefly examined for signs of
intoxication." 5 If such symptoms were detected, the motorist would be
directedto a location out of traffic flow where police would check the driver's
license and car's registration' 1 6 If needed, officers would conduct field sobri-
ety tests, which could result in arrests." 7 "All other drivers would be permit-
ted to resume their journey immediately.""' In Sitz, the sobriety checkpoint
ran only once (for 75 minutes) and resulted in the seizure of 126 vehicles (for
an average of 25 seconds each)." 9 Ultimately, the police detained two drivers
for field sobriety testing and one of these was arrested for driving under the
influence.20 One motorist drove through without stopping and also was
arrested for driving under the influence.'
In gauging the reasonableness of sobriety checkpoint seizures, the Sitz
Court found Martinez-Fuerte particularly helpful." Chief Justice Rehnquist
employed Martinez-Fuerte to defend the Sitz Court's use of balancing in a
setting outside of the typical "special needs" context. Because the Martinez-
Fuerte Court had balanced the interests when dealing with "police stops of
motorists on public highways," so too could the Sitz Court, even though it
assessed the nonspecial government need of police detection of driving under
the influence."z In this sense, Sitz was an explicit expansion of special needs
balancing into the criminal law investigation realm.
In following Martinez-Fuerte's lead, the Sitz opinion applied essentially
the same balancing test, with remarkably similar results. As in Martinez-
Fuerte, the Sitz Court found the weight of the government's interests to be
substantial, stating: "No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the
drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it." 24 Martinez-
Fuerte's impact was even more strongly felt "on the other scale -the measure







122. Id. at 452-53. The seizures included "the initial stop of each motorist passing through
[the] checkpoint and the associated preliminary questioning and observation by checkpoint
officers." Id. at 450-51.
123. Id. at 450.
124. Id. at 451. Chief Justice Rehnquist compared the highway death toll with the
casualties of war: "The increasing slaughter on our highways... now reaches the astounding
figures only heard of on the battlefield." Id. (quoting Breithauptv. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439
(1957)).
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of the intrusion on motorists""25- because Chief Justice Rehnquist essentially
equated the invasions stemming from immigration and sobriety checkpoints:
"We see virtually no difference between the levels of intrusion on law-abiding
motorists from the brief stops necessary to the effectuation of these two types
of checkpoints, which to the average motorist would seem identical save for
the nature of the questions the checkpoint officers might ask."' 26 Thus, after
consideration of Martinez-Fuerte's "objective intrusion" and "subjective in-
trusion" factors, the Sitz Court determined that the impact on the motorist
from immigration and sobriety checkpoints was "indistinguishable."'27 How-
ever, in assessing the subjective intrusion prong, the Sitz Court again empha-
sized the circumstances unique to fixed checkpoints, such as each driver's
ability to see other motorists being subjected to the same treatment and the
"visible signs of the officers' authority."'28 Once again the Court, in uphold-
ing a scheme in which officers were able to seize motorists without individu-
alized suspicion, emphasized the peculiar nature of the fixed checkpoint, in
contrast to the typical traffic stop.
Sitz is important for still another development. It expanded the Court's
evaluation of the "effectiveness" portion of reasonableness balancing. Con-
cerned about usurping the policy making role of the more "politically
accountable" branches, Chief Justice Rehnquist set the bar measuring the
"effectiveness" of the relevant government program at an extremely low
level. 9 In identifying the threshold of effectiveness the Fourth Amendment
requires, the Sitz Court considered the prior cases of Prouse and Martinez-
Fuerte. It noted that Prouse failed to establish effectiveness because the
government offered "no empirical evidence" that random stops for license
checks would promote highway safety.)' In contrast, Martinez Fuerte
provided numbers. At one of the case's checkpoints, "illegal aliens were
found in only 0.12 percent of the vehicles passing through the checkpoint."''
125. Id.
126. Id. at451-452.
127. Id. at 445.
128. Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976)).
129. Id. at 453. The Sitz Court recognized:
Experts in police science might disagree over which of several methods of
apprehending drunken drivers is preferable as an ideal. But for purposes of Fourth
Amendment analysis, the choice among such reasonable alternatives remains with
the governmental officials who have aunique understanding of, and aresponsibility
for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers.
Id. at 453-54.
130. Id. at 454.
131. Id. at455.
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This percentage, although extremely small, contributed to the Martinez-Fuerte
Court's seeing "a rather complete picture of the effectiveness of the San Cle-
mente checkpoint." '132 To prove effectiveness, the government must merely
provide some information, beyond simply nothing, to establish a link between
the State program and a concrete result.
The result of the checkpoint cases is a balancing analysis skewed in favor
of abandoning the fundamental right of individualized suspicion. In the cases
that appeared before the Court, the government activities intruding upon
motorists were aimed at problems having a wide scope: immigration and
drunken driving. Such a context resulted in the collection of statistics from
across the nation, enabling the government to characterize its interests in the
weightiest terms. Further, Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz combined to create an
especially forgiving standard for the effectiveness of the official program
under review. In contrast, the individual's interest, which suffered only a
temporary intrusion (under the safety of public eyes on the roadway and in the
collective security of blanket stops), was minimized.
After decades of undermining the Fourth Amendment's individualized
suspicion requirement, the Court returned to it in Whren v. United States.'
In fact, the Whren Court applied the strictest standard of suspicion on the
street: probable cause.'34 In Whren, plain-clothes vice-squad officers, while
patrolling a "high drug area" of Washington, D.C., noticed two youths seated
in a truck at a stop sign. 35 The officers observed that the driver was looking
down into the lap of the passenger and further noted that the truck remained
stopped for over 20 seconds, "an unusually longtime."'36 When the unmarked
police car made a U-turn to head back toward the truck, the truck suddenly
turned, without signaling, and sped away. 37 The police followed and ulti-
mately approached the truck, resulting in a plain view seizure of cocaine from
Whren's hands by Officer Soto. 3 Whren moved to suppress the cocaine.
Although he did not contest that the officers possessed probable cause to
believe that the driver of the truck had committed various traffic violations,
he contended that the officers' "asserted ground for approaching the vehicle -
to give the driver a warning concerning traffic violations-was pretextual."
39
132. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 554.
133. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).





139. Id. The driver violated the traffic laws by failing to "give full time and attention to
the operation" of his vehicle, turning without signaling, and speeding. Id. at 1772-73 (quoting
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When the case appeared before the Supreme Court, Whren focused on
the subjective motivations behind Officer Soto's actions. Whren argued that
traffic regulations were "unique," because:
the use of automobiles is so heavily and minutely regulated that total com-
pliance with traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible[.] [Therefore,] a
police officer will almost invariably be able to catch any given motorist in
a technical violation. This creates the temptation to use traffic stops as a
means of investigating other law violations, as to which no probable cause
or even articulable suspicion exists. 4
Whren therefore contended that probable cause should not be enough tojusti-
fy traffic stops.
Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, found this argument
unavailing. The Whren Court echoed a fundamental principle already con-
sidered as a given by the time of Prouse and Mimms: "As a general matter,
the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred."'' Thus, if a
reasonable officer in Officer Soto's shoes could objectively formulate prob-
able cause that Whren's driver violated the traffic laws, the traffic stop was
lawful, despite any ulterior motives harbored by Officer Soto himself.4 '
Indeed, Justice Scalia announced, "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."'43 The same held true
for reasonableness in general: "[T]he Fourth Amendment's concern with
'reasonableness' allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances,
whatever the subjective intent."'"
When Whren contended that the balance of interests weighed in his
favor, the Court conceded that every Fourth Amendment case, turning as it
D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 18, § 2213.4 (1995)).
140. Id. at 1773.
141. Id. Indeed, the Court cited both Prouse and Mimms as authority for this basic tenet.
See id. at 1772 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,659 (1979); Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977)).
142. Id. at 1774. Justice Scalia repeatedly and emphatically drove this point home: "Not
only have we never held ... that an officer's motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior
under the Fourth amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary." Id. He
continued: "We flatly dismissed the idea that an ulterior motive might serve to strip the agents
of their legal justification." Id. Additionally, Justice Scalia explained: "[W]e said that '[s]ub-
jective intent alone.., does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional'.
We ... established that 'the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is
hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does
not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that
action."' Id. (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1775.
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does on "reasonableness," involved a balancing exercise. 45 However, when
the search or seizure at issue was supported by probable cause, "the result of
that balancing is not in doubt.1, 46 In fact, Justice Scalia offered Prouse and
Martinez-Fuerte as illustrations that "detailed" balancing was required only
when probable cause was lacking. 147 In contrast, when probable cause existed,
true balancing was needed in only the most extreme cases, such as in the use
of deadly force or physical penetration of the body.
148
Justice Scalia's statements are disturbing because they point toward
result-oriented reasoning. When the government can justify its actions in the
form of probable cause, the Court will find no need to go through the motions
of a balancing analysis. However, if the State falls short because its agents
acted in the absence of probable cause, the Court might oblige by balancing
the government out of its own mess.
The Court reaffirmed its adherence to the objective reasonableness
standard in Ohio v. Robinette,149 which it decided only three months before
Wilson!"° In Robinette, Deputy Sheriff Roger Newsome pulled over Robert
D. Robinette for speeding in a construction zone on the interstate.'5' Deputy
Newsome asked for and received Robinette's driver's license, determined by
computer that Robinette had no previous violations, ordered Robinette out of
his car, and turned on the patrol car's video camera. 52 After issuing a verbal
traffic warning to Robinette, Deputy Newsome asked: "One question before
you get gone: [A]re you carrying any illegal contraband in your car? Any
weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?"'53 When Robinette re-
sponded, "No," DeputyNewsome asked for and received consent to search the
car, resulting in the recovery of marijuana and methylenedioxymethampheta-
mine.'54
Robinette, who was arrested following the discovery, moved to suppress
the evidence Deputy Newsome discovered."5 Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme
Court, concerned with the average motorist's ignorance as to a traffic stop's
proper scope, created a "bright-line" warning requirement that:




149. 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
150. Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417,421 (1996).
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citizens stopped for traffic offenses be clearly informed by the detaining
officer when they are free to go after a valid detention, before an officer
attempts to engage in a consensual interrogation. Any attempt at consen-
sual interrogation must be preceded by the phrase "At this time you legally
are free to go" or by words of similar import.'56
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, rejected any per se
warning requirement. Echoing Whren, he admonished that Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness was "measured in objective terms by examining the
totality of the circumstances."'5 7 In assessing this reasonableness, the Chief
Justice announced, "we have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead
emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry."' 58 The
repudiation of bright lines occurred despite the citation to Mimms's automatic
police prerogative to order drivers out of cars, which was cited only two
paragraphs earlier in the Robinette opinion.'59 The plain inference was that
Mimms was a marginalized exception to the general rule "eschewing" bright
lines in Fourth Amendment cases. This point was further emphasized by later
references to the Court's refusal to adopt a per se rule in other Fourth Amend-
ment cases."60 Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who only months later would
author Wilson, established an explicit record of Supreme Court rejection of
bright-line rules.
III. Maryland v. Wilson's Creation of an Absolute Right of Police to
Order Passengers Out of Lawfully Stopped Vehicles
A. Factual Background
At about 7:30 p.m. on June 8, 1994, Maryland State Trooper David
Hughes observed a white Nissan Maxima speeding sixty-four miles per hour
in a fifty-five mile-per-hour zone of Interstate 95 in Baltimore County. 6'
156. Id. at 419-20 (quoting State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 696 (Ohio 1995), revd,




160. Id. The Robinette Court noted:
We have previously rejected a per se rule very similar to that adopted by the
Supreme Court of Ohio in determining the validity of a consent to search. In
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, it was argued that such a consent could not be valid
unless the defendant knew that he had a right to refuse the request. We rejected this
argument ....
Id. (citation omitted). In addition, the Court cited other cases in which it refused to craft an
absolute rule. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991); Michigan v. Chestemut, 486
U.S. 567, 572-73 (1988); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983).
161. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997) (No. 95-1268).
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Trooper Hughes noticed that the car lacked license plates, except for "a paper
tag kind of hanging half off, half on that said Enterprise Rent-A-Car.""6
Trooper Hughes activated his cruiser's lights and siren to pull the car over, but
the car continued for one and one-half miles before finally stopping." Dur-
ing the pursuit, the trooper observed three occupants in the car. " The front
seat passenger turned and looked at him several times, while both passengers
"continuously ducked below the seat level and then reappeared."' 65 Once
stopped, Trooper Hughes still observed "a lot of movement in the car," which
caused him to hesitate in approaching it.'66 When he exited his cruiser,
Hughes observed that the driver, Mr. McNichol, had already alighted from the
Maxima. 6 Trooper Hughes had McNichol meet him between the two cars
where he advised McNichol that he had been speeding. 6 Hughes then asked
to see McNichol's license and registration.69 McNichol complied and pro-
duced a valid Connecticut license, explaining that his destination was South
Carolina. 7  McNichol appeared to Hughes to be "unusually nervous"1 71 be-
cause he was "trembling" and answering "every question with a question.
1 72
McNichol explained that the rental papers were in the car and the trooper told
him to retrieve them. 3 The front seat passenger, Jerry Lee Wilson, was
himself "sweating and extremely nervous."'" Concerned for his own safety,
Trooper Hughes asked Wilson to exit the Nissan. 7 Wilson initially refused
162. Id. (citation omitted).
163. Id.
164. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 884 (1997).
165. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Wilson (No. 95-1268).
166. Id. at2-3.




171. Id. (citation omitted).
172. State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 1, 2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 882
(1997).
173. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997) (No. 95-1268).
174. Id.
175. Id. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland noted Trooper Hughes's response
when asked why he had directed Wilson out of the car:
Well, due to the movement in the vehicle I thought possibly there could be a hand-
gun in the vehicle. I had concern for my safety. At that time when Mr. McNichol
went back to the car, I asked Mr. Wilson to step out, that is [sic] my whole purpose
of not approaching the vehicle, by myself, with three occupants in the vehicle, I
wanted each one out at a time to speak to each individual, for my safety.
Wilson, 664 A.2d at 3.
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and then opened the door and took one step out, causing crack cocaine to fall
to the ground. 76 Wilson, who was arrested and charged with possession of
cocaine with the intent to distribute, moved to suppress the evidence, arguing
that Hughes's order to exit the car was an unreasonable seizure. 77
B. Rulings in the Lower Courts
The Circuit Court for Baltimore County found that Trooper Hughes's
ordering of Wilson out of the car constituted an unreasonable seizure under
the Fourth Amendment and therefore granted Wilson's motion to suppress.178
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed, refusing to
extend Mimms's per se rule to passengers.1 79 The appeals court's ruling was
based on a myriad of intricate arguments, some persuasive, others based on
misinterpretations of law. Interestingly, both the state court's cogent conten-
tions and its erroneous rationales offer insight into the Supreme Court's
holding in Wilson.
The central theme of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland's opinion
was that Mimms was never meant to be more than a narrow rule allowing
police the prerogative of ordering drivers from their cars. Judge Moylan,
writing for a unanimous court, cautioned against extending Mimms:
It is treacherous to attempt to extract too much meaning from Pennsylvania
v. Mimms. It is a six-page, unsigned opinion explaining a summary dis-
position reached without benefit oforal argument. One must be careful not
to read more meaning into such an opinion than the authors ever intended
to put there. 8
The court further noted that Mimms was "completely silent" regarding any
automatic right to order the passenger out of a car.' This is of particular
interest because such a passenger did exist in Mimms: "There had coinciden-
tally been a second occupant of Harry Mimms's vehicle who, it turned out,
was carrying a .32 caliber revolver. Once that narrative fact was mentioned,
however, the armed passenger dropped totally from sight and the opinion does
not further allude to him even obliquely."'8 Moreover, Judge Moylan recog-
nized that the Mimms Court "went out of its way to disclaim any consideration
176. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Wilson (No. 95-1268).
177. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 884 (1997).
178. Id.
179. Id.; State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 1, 10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 882
(1997).
180. Wilson, 664 A.2d at 4.
181. Id. at 5.
182. Id.
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of the rights or vulnerabilities of passengers."'83
Thus, any extension of Mimms's per se power to order vehicle exits had
to survive the state court's careful balancing of the competing interests. On
the "societal-interest pan of the balance," Judge Moylan identified two inter-
ests deserving protection in Mimms: (1) protecting the officer from harm from
"oncoming traffic," and (2) protecting the officer from harm "at the hands of
the driver."'84 The state court considered the traffic concern in Mimms to be
weightier than it would be in the typical case involving passengers because
stopped vehicles usually pull to the right, thus exposing the officer only if he
or she approached the driver's side of the car."85 The lessening of the traffic
risk bothered Judge Moylan little because he deemed Mimms's traffic factor
as "clearly little more than a makeweight," its absence therefore having
virtually no effect on the overall balance of interests.'86 Mimms's "predomi-
nant societal interest" of protecting the officer from an armed and dangerous
driver weighed the same as the government's interest in protecting police from
armed and dangerous passengers. 7 Thus, the overall "societal interest is just
as great when considering protecting an officer from a passenger as it is when
protecting an officer from a driver."'
188
However, the similarities ended when the focus shifted to the scale's
other pan-that holding the passenger's interests. 9 Judge Moylan observed
that a traffic stop directly subjects the driver to detention "on an inpersonam
basis."'90 The driver is "not permitted to walk away from the scene and
disappear into the sunset," but must instead remain to offer evidence of a valid
driver's license and registration and further to submit to receiving a ticket or
being placed under custodial arrest. 9 ' Because the driver is indeed already
. 183. Id. at 6. The court quoted Mimms: "The State does not, and need not, go so far as to
suggest that an officer may frisk the occupants of any car stopped for a traffic violation. Rather,
it only argues that it is permissible to order the driver out of the car." Id. (quoting Pennsylvania
v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 n.5 (1977)). Further, Judge Moylan accurately, albeit harshly,
characterizedthe Supreme Court's stray references in later opinions, such as Michigan v. Long's
"police may order persons out of an automobile" statement, as "no more than ... careless,
casual, and passing instances of the most obiter of dicta." Id. at 6 (quoting Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1047-48 (1983) (citations omitted)).
184. Id. at 8.
185. Id. at 8-9.
186. Id. at 9.
187. Id. Judge Moylan noted: "[I]t is self-evidentthatan armed and dangerous passenger
poses just as great a threat to an officer as does an armed and dangerous driver." Id.
188. Id.
189. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 886 (1997).
190. State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 1,9 (Md. Ct Spec. App. 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
191. Id.
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detained by virtue of the traffic stop, the request to exit the car is a "small
incremental intrusion."' 2 In contrast, the passenger, having done nothing
wrong, cannot receive even a traffic citation. 9 While the driver is stuck with
the police, "[t]he passenger is presumptively free to abandon the driver to the
clutches of the law and to hail a cab."'94 Therefore, the demand ofthepassen-
ger, unlike that of the driver, to get out of the car is "not a mere shift of the
location of[an] already established detention," but the creation of a detention
itself.'95 This difference in individual interests between drivers and passen-
gers prevented the state court from extendingMimms's absolute police prerog-
ative to passengers.
The state of Maryland, however, did not place all its faith in Mimms
because it had a fallback argument. Its second line of defense was simple:
Trooper Hughes's ordering of Wilson out of the car was a valid Terry stop.'96
The state court vehemently rejected this contention, derisively labeling it "A
False Trail." '97 Ultimately, Judge Moylan adopted an entirely different guide-
line for passenger order-outs. The court based its analysis on procedural
grounds, misinterpretation of Fourth Amendment law, and fear.
At the outset, Judge Moylan would not permit any argument that the pas-
sengers' behavior created reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop because the
state had failed to make this contention at the suppression hearing.'98 How-
ever, he then went on to criticize the Terry stop argument on its merits. Judge
Moylan believed that Terry's "articulable suspicion" literally must be articu-
lated by the officer acting upon it."' Failure to do so, even in the face of




196. Id. at 3.
197. Id.
198. Id. This was not the only procedural obstacle identified by the state court. Judge
Moylan also noted: "If these were not impediments enough, the State urges us to exercise our
own independent constitutional appraisal on ade novo basis. Such appellate latitude is not avail-
able to us." Id. This is not an accurate statement of the law today. See Ornelas v. United States,
116 S. Ct. 1657,1663 (1996) (holding that determinations ofreasonable suspicion and probable
cause made during searches or seizures unsupported by warrants should be reviewed de novo).
199. State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 1, 3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 882
(1997). The state court ruled:
Articulable suspicion, for either a stop or a frisk, requires not simply the external
circumstances that wouldjustify such particularized suspicion. It requires, in addi-
tion, that the officer purporting to act on the basis of such suspicion actually articu-
late such a purpose and such a basis for action.... It is, moreover, the officer who
must do the articulating, not the Attorney General by way of appellate afterthought.
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"external circumstances that would justify such particularized suspicion" was
fatal to the stop's legality.2" As a result, Judge Moylan rejected the Terry
justification despite a wealth of facts pointing toward reasonable suspicion:
"[The conclusion of the judge who granted the motion to suppress] was not
that there was no basis for a reasonable suspicion that Wilson was armed and
dangerous, but rather that Trooper Hughes entertained no such suspicion,
reasonable or unreasonable.1
20 1
The force of this illogic created fundamental errors in the state court
opinion. Judge Moylan's fixation with the officer's subjective motivations
caused State v. Wilson to run afoul of the Supreme Court's holding in Whren
that an officer's subjective mental state is irrelevant so long as his actions can
be justified by objective reasonableness. Equally troubling, the state court's
misapprehension of the law caused its opinion to derail. Judge Moylan veered
away from concluding that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion,
a ruling grounded not only upon a wealth of facts but on well-established law,
toward a vulnerable balancing analysis regarding the extension of Mimms.
Since the state court refused to extend Mimms's per se rule to cover Wil-
son's exit from the vehicle, it searched for another formula to guide police in
the future. Judge Moylan concluded that an officer's exit order to a passenger
did require "some individualized or particularized suspicion. 20 2 However,
perhaps due to its confusion about what constituted "articulable facts," Judge
Moylan shied away from reasonable suspicion, instead adopting a "heightened
caution" level of justification which was "less than, and different from"
Terry's threshold.2 3 Thus, apparently due to a misinformed fear of reason-
able suspicion, Judge Moylan created yet another level of suspicion, compli-
cating an officer's duties and setting up an appeal to the Supreme Court.2'
200. Id. The court concluded: "In the absence of such a purpose, whether there might, in
the abstract, have been a constitutional basis for a frisk is immaterial." Id.
201. Id. at 4. The state court considered this point so important that it returned to it later
in its opinion:
Had Judge Bollinger [ who granted the motion to suppress,] found that Trooper
Hughes had reason to fear that Wilson might be in possession of a weapon and had
ordered Wilson out of the vehicle in order to frisk him for a weapon, we are not
holding that such a conclusion and such an action on the trooper's part would have
been unreasonable. That, however, is not the decision before us for review. Judge
Bollinger found, to the contrary, that the trooper had no such fear and we simply
hold that Judge Bollinger was not clearly erroneous in so finding.
Id. The "clearly erroneous" standard has been disapproved by the Supreme Court in this con-
text. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1663 (rejecting clearly erroneous standard in favor of de novo
review).
202. Wilson, 664 A.2d at 12.
203. Id. at 13.
204. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 884 (1997). Maryland initially challenged
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C. The Wilson Court's Ruling and Rationales
The Supreme Court's majority opinion, at three pages, is quite brief.2 5
This is perhaps due not only to Chief Justice Rehnquist's laconic style, but
also to his ready acceptance of a series of assumptions. Wilson opens: "In
this case we consider whether the rule of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, that a
police officer may as a matter of course order the driver of a lawfully stopped
car to exit his vehicle, extends to passengers as well."2" This framing of the
issue caused the Court, after its presentation of the facts, to launch immedi-
ately into a discussion of Mimms and the balancing analysis it entails.2"7
Indeed, without any exploration of the appropriateness of the balancing
process itself as the means to decide the issue, Chief Justice Rehnquist
summarily determined that, when assessing the weight of the government's
interests, "the same weighty interest in officer safety is present regardless of
whether the occupant of the stopped car is a driver or passenger."2 8 The
Wilson Court bolstered this conclusion with statistics: "In 1994 alone, there
were 5,762 officer assaults and 11 officers killed during traffic pursuits and
stops."2" Further, although the Court did acknowledge that the danger of
"standing in the path of oncoming traffic" typically would not exist in the case
of passengers, it took care to recognize that even this hazard remained with
"a passenger in the left rear seat., 210 Moreover, the Wilson Court counterbal-
anced any reduction in traffic danger in the passenger context by noting that
the presence of more than one occupant in a vehicle "increases the possible
sources of harm to the officer.
21'
Chief Justice Rehnquist, when considering the "personal liberty side of
the balance," conceded that "in one sense" passengers had a stronger case than
the decision rendered by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in state court. How-
ever, the Maryland Court of Appeals denied certiorari. State v. Wilson, 667 A.2d 342 (Md.
1995).
205. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 884-86. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion covers less
than three pages in West's Supreme Court Reporter. Id.
206. Id. at 884.
207. Id. at 884-85 (citation omitted).
208. Id. at 885. The organization of the sentences in its opinion demonstrates the Court's
ready acceptance of balancing. The Wilson Court first recognized that "[w]e must therefore now
decide whether the rule of Mimms applies to passengers as well as to drivers." Id. Then, with
no explanation, the next sentence begins the balancing process: "On the public interest side of
the balance ...." Id.
209. Id
210. Id.
211. Id. This point was important enough to mention a second time: "[]D]anger to an
officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the
driver in the stopped car." Id. at 886.
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did drivers.212 After all, with traffic stops, there is probable cause to believe
the driver has violated the law. No such reason exists to stop or detain the
passenger.13 Yet, the Court did not attach significance to this distinction:
"But as a practical matter, the passengers are already stopped by virtue of the
stop of the vehicle. The only change in their circumstances which will result
from ordering them out of the car is that they will be outside of, rather than
inside of, the stopped car."'214
With this observation, the Wilson Court slipped back into a consideration
of government interests. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the benefit to law
enforcement stemming from ordering a passenger out of a vehicle - denial of
access to weapons in the car's interior.25 He identified as a danger the
possibility that "a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop,"
providing a motivation to resort to violence "every bit as great" for passengers
as it is for drivers." 6 Thus, in the midst of determining the intrusion on
individual rights, the Court accidentally found itself once again concerned
with societal interests.
The Wilson Court concluded by analogizing its traffic stop to the
execution of a search warrant for narcotics in Michigan v. Summers."7 Chief
Justice Rehnquist quoted approvingly from Summers:
Although no special danger to the police is suggested by the evidence in
this record, the execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind
of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to
conceal or destroy evidence. The risk of harm to both the police and the
occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned
command of the situation.18
Just as in Summers, the balance of interests in Wilson tilted in the govern-
ment's favor.219 This balancing process provided the Court with a rationale
to hold thatMimms's rule which gives police an absolute right to order drivers
out of lawfully stopped cars extends to passengers as well."0





217. Id.; 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
218. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882,886 (1997) (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692, 702-03 (1981)).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 884, 886.
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IV Concerns Created by the Court's Establishment of an Automatic Law
Enforcement Privilege to Compel a Passenger to Exit from a Car
A. The Wilson Rule Is Based on an Improper Balancing Analysis
Chief Justice Rehnquist's readiness to jettiqon any individualized sus-
picion analysis in favor of balancing the comleting interests of Trooper
Hughes and Jerry Lee Wilson to determine Fourth Amendment reasonable-
ness represents a dramatic departure from search and seizure fundamentals.
True, as recently as 1996, the Whren Court recognized that "in principle every
Fourth Amendment case, since it turns upon a 'reasonableness' determina-
tion, involves a balancing of all relevant factors.""' Yet, Whren immediately
noted that the result of such balancing is simply "not in doubt where the
search or seizure is based upon probable cause."' This is because the bal-
ancing process envisioned in the Fourth Amendment actually occurred over
two centuries ago, and its fruits are found in the words of the Amendment
itself. Indeed, Justice Stewart realized this truism in his dissent in Michigan
v. Summers: "[T]he general rule [is] that the Fourth Amendment itself has
already performed the constitutional balance between police objectives and
personal privacy."' In New Jersey v. TL. O., 4 Justice Blackmun was even
more explicit: "Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its
balancing of interests for that of the Framers."'
Courts should avoid balancing because it is hazardous. When the Court
chooses to weigh the competing interests in order to determine whether it will
221. Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (1996).
222. Id.
223. Summers, 452 U.S. at 706 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
224. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
225. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice
Blackmun also stated:
While the Fourth Amendment speaks in terms of freedom from unreasonable
[searches], the Amendment does not leave the reasonableness of most [searches]
to the judgment of courts or government officers; the Framers of the Amendment
balanced the interests involved and decided that a [search] is reasonable only if
supported by a judicial warrant based on probable cause.
Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 722 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Even
in Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995), a case in which the Court made
liberal use of the balancing approach, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, conceded that
balancing was not the norm in the context of a criminal investigation. The Acton Court noted
that "where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal
wrongdoing, this Court has said that reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a
judicial warrant." Id at 2390.
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apply the fundamentals of the Fourth Amendment, the very nature of the
analysis prevents reliance upon the traditional Fourth Amendment anchors of
probable cause and the warrant requirement. In the absence of guidance
provided by these basic mandates, the Court may simply substitute its own
subjective notions regarding "the acceptability of certain sorts of police




Such subjectivity manifested itself in Wilson. Notably, the Court
encountered difficulty upon balancing the case's very first set offacts. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, when placing a value upon the "public interest," weighed
the numbers of assaults upon and killings of officers in traffic stops and
pursuits.227 Yet, any injuries or deaths occurring during pursuits, as tragic as
they are, have nothing to do with allowing police to order passengers out of
stopped vehicles. Even if the Wilson per se prerogative existed in the pursuit
cases, it would have provided no protection because officers would not have-
indeed could not have - exercised it while any car was in motion."
Even if the Court properly narrowed these data to include only attacks
and fatalities stemming from traffic stops, any resulting linkage between the
majority's statistics and its extension of Mimms would be unwarranted. The
data failed to provide the numbers of assaults or killings committed by
passengers rather than drivers, or the number that occurred while the attacker
was inside instead of outside of the car, or the quantity that could have been
prevented by an officer's order to a passenger to exit the vehicle. 9 Indeed,
the majority's statistics failed to prove the number of assaults or killings that
occurred in the absence of "any articulable basis for concern about the
officer's safety," a fact crucial to promoting a rule enabling police to intrude
without such individualized suspicion."0 The dearth of solid information
caused Justice Stevens to conclude in his dissent that "the statistics are as
consistent with the hypothesis that ordering passengers to get out ofavehicle
increases the danger of assault as with the hypothesis that it reduces risk." 1
The majority opinion gave the sense that the Court was ever alert to
prevent any diminution of government interests anywhere. For instance, the
226. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,764-65(1968).
227. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 885 (1997).
228. Id. at 888 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens
recognized this analytical flaw: "The majority's data aggregates assaults committed during
'[t]raffic [p]ursuits and [s]tops.' In those assaults that occur during thepursuit of a moving
vehicle, it would obviously be impossible for an officer to order a passenger out of the car." Id.
(citation omitted).
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state court acknowledged that officers were exposed to less traffic danger
when approaching passengers than drivers. 2 In contrast, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist appeared reluctant to allow the shrinkage of even this "makeweight"
state interest. 3 He begrudgingly conceded the lessened traffic danger in the
case of passengers. However, he noted that it would still exist for occupants
"in the left rear seat." 4 Then, before even leaving this sentence, the Chief
Justice replaced any lost weight on the government's side with the fact that
an increase in the number of a vehicle's occupants creates a corresponding
increase in danger to the officer. 5
The Court showed no such deference to individual interests. Although
he admitted that "the case for passengers is in one sense stronger than that for
the driver," Chief Justice Rehnquist ultimately determined the per se rule's
only practical impact upon passengers "is that they will be outside of, rather
than inside of, the stopped car." 6 Then, belying the judicial thumb on the
scales, the remainder of the paragraph purportedly devoted to the rights of the
passenger was curiously transformed into a further discussion of government
interests. Leaving intrusions on the individual behind, the Chief Justice
instead discussed the relative motivations of passengers and drivers for
violence upon officers. 7
The Wilson Court's compulsion to wallow in government concerns had
its limits. The Court was curiously silent when it came to assessing the
efficacy of the order-out prerogative in promoting officer safety. This
omission was all the more curious because the Prouse Court considered an
intrusion's productivity in advancing state interests to be an integral part of
its balancing analysis. 8 Prouse and Wilson shared significant similarities:
both concerned traffic stops, both involved the vital state interest of pre-
serving safety, and both required a choice between per se and fact-based rules.
Interestingly, when the Court actually bothered to go through the efficacy
analysis in Prouse, it concluded that the "most effective" means of maintain-
ing safety was reliance upon officers' observation of facts in the individual
case. The Wilson decision made no similar attempt to measure the order-out
rule's effectiveness. Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained in a footnote
that "there is 'a strong public interest in minimizing' the number of assaults
232. State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 1, 8 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 882
(1997). As previously noted, this was because: "stopped vehicles generally pull to the right-
hand curb." Id
233. Id. at 9.
234. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 885 (1997).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 886.
237. Id.
238. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1978).
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on law officers, . . and we believe that our holding today is more likely to
accomplish that result than would be the case if [Justice Stevens's] views
were to prevail." 9 Such an unsupported hope would not even pass the
diluted Sitz efficacy test because the Court in that case still required some
empirical evidence linking efficacy to need."0
In the half-paragraph that the majority devoted to personal liberty, it
seriously undervalued the individual rights that the per se rule put at stake.
Wilson's prerogative will allow unjustified government invasion in the very
context where arguably most people interact with police. The Court itself has
previously recognized that "[b]ecause of the extensive regulation of motor
vehicles and traffic, . . . the extent of police-citizen contact involving auto-
mobiles will be substantially greater than police-citizen contact in a home or
office." '24 1 The aggregation of each ofthese invasions of the person in literally
millions of stops every year easily amounts to "significant law enforcement
activity."242 Yet, Wilson signaled that it could not be bothered with providing
the citizenry the same kind of in-depth consideration it gave the government.
The Court did not even go through a pretense of bifurcating the individual's
interests into Martinez-Fuerte's "subjective" and !'objective" intrusions. The
Court also failed to mention variables once seen as particularly relevant, such
as the randomness of the location of the intrusion, the unreviewability of the
officer's choice in making the invasion, and the impact on innocent individu-
als. Such factors, for decades warranting attention in any balancing analysis,
did not even make a blip on the Wilson Court's radar screen.
Perhaps the most telling pronouncement in the Court's balancing anal-
ysis was its analogy to the execution of a search warrant in Summers. The
Summers Court recognized that warrants often involve dangers of sudden
violence or destruction of evidence and, therefore, any such risk would be
minimized if police "routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situ-
ation."243 Summers permitted officers to detain a person headed out of a
residence while they conducted their search of the premises pursuant to a
warrant.2' Wilson equated the execution of a narcotics search warrant, a
situation where officers possess enough information to convince a detached
and neutral magistrate that probable cause exists that evidence of afelony is
239. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886 n.2.
240. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,454 (1990).
241. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
242. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 888 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In dissent,
Justice Stevens noted: "In Maryland alone, there are something on the order of one million
traffic stops each year." Id.
243. Id. at 886 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-03 (1981)).
244. Id.; Summers, 452 U.S. at 695.
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at a particular location, to every traffic stop no matter how minor. The facile
nature of the balancing process enabled Chief Justice Rehnquist to compare
the treatment of felons subject to full-scale investigations to that of innocents
who happen to be in cars with drivers who commit any infraction, including
insignificant violations such as a broken tail light. The Court applied this
approach even though the myriad traffic stops that occur daily presumably
dwarf the number of warrant executions. 5
Summers itself would not have made such a leap. Justice Stevens, who
authored the majority opinion in Summers - but who dissented in Wilson -
crafted a three-factor test for seizures: (1) the seizure "constitutes [a] limited
intrusion[ ] on the personal security of those detained," (2) the seizure is 'jus-
tified by such substantial law enforcement interests that they may be made on
less than probable cause," and (3) "police have an articulable basis for sus-
pecting criminal activity.1
246
In determiningthat the seizure of Summers's person constituted a limited
intrusion, Justice Stevens considered the context of the invasion to be "[o]f
prime importance. 2 47 Summers saw the existence of a warrant to search the
house to be particularly significant because it meant that "[a] neutral and
detached magistrate had found probable cause to believe that the law was
being violated in that house and had authorized a substantial invasion of the
privacy of the persons who resided there."248 Thus, the Court placed Sum-
mers's seizure in the bigger picture of a search of his home: "The detention
of one of the residents while the premises were searched, although admittedly
a significant restraint on his liberty, was surely less intrusive than the search
itself."249 Likewise, Justice Stevens based several other assumptions regard-
ing the seizure's lack of intrusiveness on the fact that it occurred within the
larger invasion of a search of a home. The seizure was not an onerous imposi-
tion because most people would actually wish to remain anyway "in order to
observe the search of their possessions.""0 Moreover, officers likely would
not exploit the detention to obtain information because the surest source of
evidence would be the search itself. 1 Finally, since the detention occurred
within Summers's own home, it at most "only minimally" would add to the
stigma already flowing from the search itself and would not involve the in-
dignity or inconvenience connected to seizures occurring outside of a resi-
245. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 888 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
246. Summers, 452 U.S. at 699.
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dence. 2 Hence, the Summers Court's ultimate finding of minimal intrusion
was intimately linked to the particular facts surrounding the detention: this
was not an isolated stop on a public street, but instead was one within the
privacy provided by the home and dwarfed by the larger invasion of a search
pursuant to a warrant.
The second factor, that of justification by substantial law enforcement
interests, was similarly anchored to Summers's particular facts. Justice
Stevens listed three reasons that providedjustification in the specific context
of "detention of an occupant of premises being searched for contraband pursu-
ant to a valid warrant": "preventing flight," "minimizing risk of harm to the
officers," and "orderly completion of the search." 3 Again, all were uniquely
tied to the execution of the warrant. Flight was a concern because the warrant
might result in turning up "incriminating evidence." 4 Further, safety issues
were connected not only to the unique nature of warrant searches, but also to
the particular object of these searches: "The execution of a warrant to search
for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence
or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence." 5 Read in the context of the
opinion as a whole, these words take on a meaning entirely different from that
intended by the Wilson Court.
Finally, the third element of "articulable facts supporting the detention"
was also tied to the special characteristics of the seizure at issue. In Summers,
the Court deemed it "appropriate" to consider not only the mere existence of
individualized suspicion, but also its "nature." 6 Summers's individualized
suspicion was of the highest level required for seizures- probable cause. Fur-
ther, this probable cause was not merely arrived at by a law enforcement offi-
cial, but also by ajudicial officer involved in the warrant process. Justice Ste-
vens found the presence of a warrant in Summers to be particularly relevant:
The existence of a search warrant ... provides an objective justification
for the detention. A judicial officer has determined that police have
probable cause to believe that someone in the home is committing a crime.
Thus a neutral magistrate rather than an officer in the field has made the
critical determination that the police should be given a special authoriza-
tion to thrust themselves into the privacy of a home. The connection of an
occupant to that home gives the police officer an easily identifiable and
certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a
detention of that occupant.257
252. Id. at 702.
253. Id. at 702-03.
254. Id. at 702.
255. Id. (emphasis added).
256. Id. at 703.
257. Id. at 703-04.
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Summers's seizure was not justified by some per se right to detain him.
Instead, Summers's holding clearly established that probable cause and a
warrant were the requisite ingredients for this particular detention: "We hold
that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly
carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises
while a proper search is conducted." 28
In New York v. Class, decided five years after Summers, the Court
adhered to its restrictive interpretation of the seizure right crafted by Justice
Stevens in Summers. 9 Justice O'Connor, writing for the Class majority,
reiterated Summers's three factors with slightly different phrasing: (1) "the
safety of the officers was served by the governmental intrusion", (2) "the
intrusion was minimal," and (3) "the search stemmed from some probable
cause focusing suspicion on the individual affected by the search." 6 How-
ever, as noted above, Class contained an even more thought-provoking pro-
nouncement than its assertion that the three factor test applied to Summers.26" '
It identified Mimms as a case built on Summers's three prongs.262 Mimms, the
precedent most central to Wilson's holding, was based on a test which
included theformation ofindividualizedsuspicion toward the person affected
by the intrusion. In fact, Class made Mimms's requirement of individualized
suspicion explicit: "InPennsylvaniav. Mimms... the officers had personally
observed the seized individual in the commission of a traffic offense before
requesting that he exit his vehicle.
63
The Summers three-factor test was incorporated in the Mimms rule."
However, although Chief Justice Rehnquist cites Summers to support his
balancing of interests in Wilson,265 the Summers three-factor test is conspicu-
ously absent. Yet, in order to determine if Wilson falls within the Summers!
Mimms/Class line of case law, an officer's demand of a passenger to exit a
vehicle needs to be tested against this three-factor formula. The first factor,
which involves the "safety of the officers.., served by the governmental
intrusion," may at first blush seem to be in the government's favor. 6 Yet,
Class recharacterized this first hurdle, making it more difficult to clear. A
genuine officer safety issue would arise when "a search or seizure has as its
258. Id. at 705.
259. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 117-18 (1985).
260. Id.
261. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text (discussing Class).
262. Class, 475 U.S. at 117-18.
263. Id. at 117.
264. Id. at 117-18.
265. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 886 (1997).
266. Id. at 117.
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immediate object a search for a weapon."" However, "[w]hen the officer's
safety is less directly served by the detention, something more than objec-
tively justifiable suspicion is necessary to justify the intrusion if the balance
is to tip in favor of the legality of the governmental intrusion., 265 Interest-
ingly, the Class Court then offered Mimms as an example where an officer's
safety is "less directly served. " 69 In this "less direct" situation, not only was
individualized suspicion necessary for official action, probable cause also
must exist."10 This requirement simply cannot be satisfied in Wilson. Unlike
Mimms, in which the personal observations of law breaking related to the
person ultimately seized, in Wilson the violations were connected to a third
party, the driver. When Trooper Hughes ordered Wilson out of the car, he
had no probable cause whatsoever that Wilson caused the car to speed sixty-
four miles per hour in a fifty-five mile-per-hour zone. Thus, Wilson founders
upon the first factor.
Wilson fares no better with the second factor: "[t]he intrusion was
minimal.""27 Perhaps Chief Justice Rehnquist would offer that for all practi-
cal purposes the only change resulting from Trooper Hughes's order was to
place Wilson outside of the car rather than inside of it.272 Yet, this is not what
is meant by "minimal." Again, context is crucial. Seizing Summers was min-
imal because it was less intrusive than the search of his home by warrant.
273
Ordering Mimms out of his car was minimal, or "de minimis," because the
police had already lawfully detained him.27 4 But Wilson, a passenger who
happened to be in a car driven by a speeder, was subject to no such compara-
ble authority. Therefore, detaining his person did not take place within the
backdrop of greater official intrusion, but instead took place within avacuum.
The third element of the three factor test, "the search stemmed from
some probable cause focusing suspicion on the individual affected by the
search," is the factor left most wanting in Wilson.'75 Again, Summers' home
was previously targeted in a search warrant, and Mimms had been seen per-
sonally violating the traffic laws. Meanwhile, Wilson merely sat in a passen-
ger seat of a lawfully stopped car. 76
267. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 117 (1985).
268. Id.
269. Id. (emphasis added).
270. Id. at 117-18.
271. Id.
272. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 886 (1997).
273. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-03 (1981).
274. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977).
275. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 117-18 (1986).
276. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 884. Of course, it might be tempting to argue that Trooper
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Close inspection of Summers and Mimms reveals that these cases cut
against Wilson's reasoning. Far from being invitations for extensions of per
se police power, these decisions adhered to justifications in the individual
case. Yet, logical inconsistency offered no obstacle for the Court in Wilson.
After all, Whren demonstrates balancing is often trotted out as a way to
approve a state intrusion when the government does not have sufficient evi-
dence.277 Balancing may therefore have been employed at the start because
Trooper Hughes's reasons for ordering Wilson to exit failed to sway the lower
courts.
B. The Per Se Nature of Wilson's Rule Is Both Unfounded
and Inconsistent
In Wilson, Chief Justice Rehnquist balanced his way into crafting the flat
rule that police may order any passenger out of a lawfully stopped vehicle.
This was in spite of his equally unequivocal statement in Robinette - itself
only months old-that the Court had "consistently eschewed bright-line rules,
instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry. it278
Wilson pointed out this inconsistency, prompting the Chief Justice to respond:
Respondent argues that, because we have generally eschewed bright-line
rules in the Fourth Amendment context,.. . we should not here conclude
that passengers may constitutionally be ordered out of lawfully stopped
vehicles. But, that we typically avoidperse rules concerning searches and
seizures does not mean that we have always done so; Mimms itself drew
a bright line, and we believe the principles that underlay that decision
apply to passengers as well. 79
This unabashed selective use of balancing borders upon intellectual
dishonesty. Certainly there should be some set of standards for determining
when a bright-line rule is appropriate and when it is not. Professor Wayne
LaFave, whom the Supreme Court in New Yorkv. Belton28 quotes regarding
Hughes saw Wilson make various furtive movements and that he therefore suspected Wilson
of illegal activity. Yet, unfortunately, this was not the focus of the probable cause prong of the
three-part test. Summers and Mimms were seizable despite a lack of facts specifically pointing
to their danger because other circumstances had previously connected them with criminality.
If indeed facts regarding an individual's apparent danger to the officer were relevant to the
inquiry (in other words, if the Court had limited an officer's right to order out passengers to
only those whom officers reasonably suspected were armed and dangerous), then Wilson would
have been a different case. In fact, it would have been nothing more than a restatement of
Terry.
277. Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (1996).
278. Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996).
279. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 885 n.1 (1997) (citation omitted).
280. 453 U.S. 454 (1980).
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the benefits flowing from bright lines offers "four questions" to consider
when pondering whether to adopt a bright-line rule:
(1) Does [the bright line rule] have clear and certain boundaries, so that it
in fact makes case-by-case evaluation and adjudication unnecessary?
(2) Does it produce results approximating those which would be obtained
if accurate case-by-case application of the underlying principle were
practicable? (3) Is it responsive to a genuine need to forego case-by-case
application of a principle because that approach has proved unworkable?
(4) Is it not readily subject to manipulation and abuse?"'
In applying LaFave's four questions to Wilson, the Court's rule started
out strong because it easily met the first criterion of having "clear and certain
boundaries.12 2 The police right to order out passengers is simply the right to
compel them to exit the vehicle they are occupying. The right triggered
clearly enough; the officer may exercise the right whenever the officer
lawfully stops a vehicle. However, it falls far short of adequately answering
the second question's concerns because its results do not even attempt to
"approximate those which would be obtained if -accurate case-by-case
application" were practicable.283 The Wilson order-out rule was meant to
protect officers from passengers posing danger while seated in automobiles.
Yet, it applies to all passengers, even those showing no signs whatsoever of
danger. Thus, it will scoop up all individuals, harmless as well as dangerous.
In contrast, a case-by-case evaluation based on Terry's traditional and, for
decades, apparently workable reasonable suspicion standard would a cast a
much more narrowly tailored net that identified only those the officer suspects
of posing a risk of harm.
281. Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing
"Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 307, 325 (1982) [hereinafter LaFave,
Fourth Amendment]. The Supreme Court quoted the following language:
Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the exclusionary rule, is
primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and thus
ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the
context of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged.
A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts
and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the
sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed,
but they may be "literally impossible of application by the officer in the field."
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1980) (quoting Wayne RK LaFave, "Case-by-Case
Adjudication" Versus "StandardizedProcedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. Cr. REV.
127, 141).
282. LaFave, Fourth Amendment, supra note 281, at 325.
283. Id.
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Wilson's per se rule fares no better with LaFave's third question.2 4
There is no genuine need to forego a case-by-case inquiry into a passenger's
dangerousness. 215 Officers, having daily (for three decades) applied Terry's
reasonable suspicion standard in a variety of contexts to determine the poten-
tial of a suspect being armed and dangerous, should be able to employ this
common sense test with passengers.8 6
Finally, Wilson creates concerns as to the fourth question, whether the
rule is "readily subject to manipulation and abuse."2 7 Robinette offered a
prime example of Wilson's potential hazards to personal security. Like Jerry
Lee Wilson, Robert Robinette was ordered out of a car during a lawful traffic
stop.288 Interestingly, once he had Robinette out ofthe car, Deputy Newsome
felt free to quiz him regarding possession of contraband, such as weapons or
drugs.289 In fact, he framed his question to Robinette as one that should be
answered "before you get gone," despite the fact that he no longer had a legal
justification for restricting Robinette's movement.2' Had crack cocaine not
fortuitously fallen from Wilson's person, one could easily see Wilson re-
ceiving similar questioning.
Hence, LaFave's standards offer no insight into the Court's selection of
when to draw a bright line in Fourth Amendment litigation. Recent cases
considering bright lines point to both an answer and a disturbing pattern. In
Robinette, the Court rejected a per se rule that would have created an obliga-
tion for police to warn citizens of certain Fourth Amendment rights. Specif-
ically, the Ohio Supreme Court mandated that the officer inform persons
stopped for traffic offenses "when they are free to go after a valid detention,
before an officer attempts to engage in a consensual interrogation" in order
to request consent to search.29' The Robinette Court found that voluntariness
of consent was an issue of fact "determined from all the circumstances" and
notjust from the existence or absence of a warning.29 In reaching this result,
284. Id.
285. See id (listing need to forego case-by-case inquiry as factor in adopting bright-line
rule).
286. See infra Part IV.C (applying Terry to Wilson's facts).
287. LaFave, Fourth Amendment, supra note 281, at 325.
288. See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text (discussing Robinette's facts in
detail).
289. Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 419 (1996).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 420. The state supreme court offered the following language as an example:
"At this time you legally are free to go." State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 696 (Ohio 1995),
rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
292. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 421 (citing Schenckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231
(1973)).
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the Robinette Court cited Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,2" in which the Court
refused to adopt a warning requirement that persons be advised that they have
a right to refuse to consent to a search.294 The reasoning in Schneckloth
centered on the Court's concern for an accurate reading of "the totality of
all the circumstances" to determine voluntariness.295 In both Robinette and
Schneckloth, the Court stressed the need for accuracy on a case-by-case basis
rather than adopting a per se requirement providing a clear sign of voluntari-
ness in each case. Interestingly, the lack of accuracy which would result from
the implementation of the warning requirements of "you are free to go" and
"1you are free to refuse consent" would be to the government's detriment. The
concern is that cases could occur in which the individual did voluntarily
consent, yet an unheeded warning requirement would still vitiate the permis-
sion to search. Thus, the Court eschewed the bright line warning mandate
because it deemed accuracy in considering all the facts a better protector of
government interests.
The Court has demonstrated the same solicitous concern for societal
rights in Fourth Amendment cases outside of the warning context. In Florida
v. Bostick,296 the Florida Supreme Court laid down a per se rule that all
questioning of passengers aboard a bus constituted a seizure because the
individual approached always felt that he or she was not free to leave.297 The
Supreme Court refused to let this rule stand, announcing that the proper
inquiry analyzed "all the circumstances surrounding the encounter. ' 298 Once
again, the accuracy sacrificed by a bright-line test would harm government
interests. A flat rule would define Fourth Amendment seizures more broadly,
covering even some circumstances when an individual did not feel the need
to comply with police requests.299 Thus, the Court has maintained a con-
sistent track record of rejecting bright-line rules that curb police power.
The Court experiences no such distaste for per se rules that increase the
reach of government power in the Fourth Amendment context. In a per cur-
iam opinion, the Mimms Court expanded police authority to order drivers out
of cars. Wilson further expanded this power to passengers in a similarly expe-
ditious fashion. Moreover, when the Court expanded the search incident to
the arrest right in Belton to include the entire passenger compartment of
293. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
294. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 421; Schenckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231-33
(1973).
295. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
296. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
297. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (1989), rev'd, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
298. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991).
299. Id. at 435-37.
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stopped vehicles, it argued that this bright line was a positive development
because it clarified Fourth Amendment rights: "In short, '[a] single familiar
standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and
expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved
in the specific circumstances they confront."' 3° Thus, the Fourth Amendment
should be made bright-line simple so that officers easily may apply it.
Strangely, the Court has taken on the least pressing of causes: aiding
police in the avoidance of missteps in the criminal justice system. The
justices concern themselves with the time constraints and the lack of expertise
of police, the law enforcementprofessionals who have chosen to train and to
operate daily within the intricacies of the law. Meanwhile, the Court has
shown no similar consideration for average citizens, who are too busy with
their own careers and families to apprise themselves of every layer of nuance
that the Court adds with each new Fourth Amendment case. These are the
true lay persons in the most need of guidance through warnings or bright
lines.
C. Wilson's Rule Exposes the Court's Irrational Fear of the
Reasonable Suspicion Standard
In defending his use of statistical data from concerns raised by Justice
Stevens, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted: "Justice Stevens agrees that there is
'a strong public interest in minimizing' the number of assaults on law
officers, and we believe that our holding today is more likely to accomplish
that result than would be the case if his views were to prevail.""3 1 Certainly,
expanding the powers of police to control citizens might indeed promote
officer safety. So would limiting other constitutional freedoms. In fact, law
enforcement longevity could probably increase dramatically by suspending
the Fourth Amendment entirely.
The willingness of the Court to leave itself open to such "slippery slope"
criticism is telling. Despite decades of decisional law explicitly hewing to
individualized suspicion and Chief Justice Rehnquist's own months-old de-
scription of the Court consistently eschewing bright-lines, the Wilson Court,
without a sentence of hesitation, simply balanced its way to a per se rule.
Why would the Court chooseto suffer such selective amnesia? Perhaps, like
other amnesiacs, it chose to forget something too frightening to face. Here,
the peril the Court irrationally avoided was reasonable suspicion's concrete
constraint on law enforcement.
300. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,458 (1980) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200, 213-14 (1981)).
301. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 886 n.2 (1997) (citation omitted).
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Reasonable suspicion, however, is a very straightforward and workable
idea. The Court has taken great pains to define probable cause, the level of
individualized suspicion embedded within the Fourth Amendment itself, as
a simple concept: "Among the adjectives used to describe the standard were
'practical,' 'fluid,' 'flexible,' 'easily applied,' and 'nontechnical.' The prob-
able-cause standard was to be seen as a'commonsense' test whose application
depended on an evaluation of the 'totality of the circumstances.""'3 2 More-
over, the Court recognized the realities of the law enforcement profession and
aimed to preserve probable cause's usefulness even in the haste typical of
criminal investigations.0 3 Of course, reasonable suspicion is an even less
demanding standard, developed as a means for allowing police action on facts
falling short of probable cause.
The Court's granting of certiorari in Wilson demonstrated its aversion to
even reasonable suspicion's lessened level of individualized suspicion. This
case possessed a wealth of specific and articulable facts to support reasonable
suspicion. Trooper Hughes's ordering of Jerry Lee Wilson out of the car was
not based on a groundless whim.3" The trooper found himself alone at night,
chasing a car filled with three occupants that refused to yield to his siren and
lights for a mile and a half.05 During this pursuit, both of the vehicle's
passengers repeatedly looked at him and ducked below sight level.3" When
the car finally did stop, its driver abruptly changed tactics by exiting the car
to meet Trooper Hughes away from the car."7 Hughes noted that the driver's
trembling nervousness was matched only by the passenger's sweaty agita-
tion.0 ' The driver's initial disregard of authority, the passenger's furtive
movements, the driver's unsolicited exit, and the palpable nervousness easily
suggest that the car's occupants had something terribly incriminating and pos-
sibly dangerous to hide inside the car. In fact, it would seem that only the
dullest or most courageous of officers would not, in this tense atmosphere,
fear that these persons might pose immediate danger.
A prosecutorial blunder barred Terry from providing the most straight-
forward solution to this matter. At the suppression hearing, the State never
advanced reasonable suspicion as a basis for Trooper Hughes's ordering
302. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,364 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
303. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983).
304. See supra Part III.A (discussing facts in Marylandv. Wilson).
305. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 884.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 1, 2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 882
(1997).
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Wilson out of the car."' Thus, the judge at the hearing thus never ruled on
the reasonable suspicion issue.31 Maryland's Court of Special Appeals held
that the government did not properly preserve this claim for appellate
review.3 ' The Supreme Court, with its broad discretion over case selection
via certiorari, curiously chose a passenger-order-out case in which the reason-
able suspicion issue was not before it. Thus, it could frame the matter as an
all-or-nothing case: allow an officer to make the small request that a passen-
ger get out of a car that was already stopped or risk the lives of police
officers. The resulting diminution of the Fourth Amendment's individualized
suspicion mandate demonstrates how poor a choice Wilson was for Supreme
Court review.
The Court's distrust of its own Terry standard is particularly troubling,
as evidenced by the lower court's decision in Wilson. Having rejected the per
se prerogative the prosecution sought, Judge Moylan hesitated to demand a
full showing of reasonable suspicion, opting instead for a third, lesser level
of justification that he labeled "heightened caution."3 2 The state court's
willingness to create unnecessary complexity in the form of a new level of
suspicion represents the potential acceleration of a vicious cycle. Judges,
uncomfortable with weighing all the specific and articulable circumstances
needed for reasonable suspicion when officer safety is at stake, may back
away from applying the standard. Lack of use of reasonable suspicion causes
it to become increasingly rare and exotic. This uniqueness, in turn, makes the
application of reasonable suspicion a still more daunting analytical task,
possibly causing courts to marginalize its use still further. The result is
ironic - a standard specifically designed to ease the officer's job and to
promote his or her safety may increasingly be seen as unworkable and even
dangerous.
D. Wilson's Rule Tears a Hole in the Constitutional Protection
of Passengers and Creates a Free Zone for Official Discretion and Abuse
Arguably, the Wilson Court was not entirely incorrect when it character-
ized as "minimal" its granting of police authority to summarily order
passengers from their vehicles." 3 In the bigger picture of the assault upon the
Fourth Amendment, this case was simply the latest advance against the right
309. Id. at 3.
310. Id.
311. Id.; see also Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 887 n.1 (1997) (Stevens, L,
dissenting).
312. Wilson, 664 A.2d at 13.
313. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at886.
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of individualized suspicion. After all, the mandate that police act only upon
ajustification based on observed facts has been slowly bled, over the decades,
into virtual nonexistence. ,Carroll's probable cause requirement was first
diluted into reasonable suspicion in Terry by the same rationale relied on by
the Wilson Court: officer safety. Further, the balancing process alluded to in
Terry swallowed the general rule adhering to individualized suspicion, allow-
ing cases such as Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz to simply eliminate any fact-based
justification outright.
Yet, the devolution of the individualized suspicion requirement was not
so simple or direct. Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz were initially viewed as repre-
senting the exception rather than the rule. After all, the justices authoring the
opinions stressed the unique factual contexts of checkpoints. Brignoni-Ponce
and Prouse countered the balancing approach by reasserting the need for
individualized suspicion in the context of the typical roadway stop. Even
Mimms's per se order-out rule, with the gloss given to it by Class, was limited
to specific circumstances, one of which required the existence of probable
cause to believe that the individual affected had engaged in wrongdoing.
Therefore, Wilson's per se prerogative, which cut against the caution ex-
pressed in Prouse and ignored the three factors undergirding Mimms and
Class, did not in the final analysis create a merely "minimal" intrusion on the
individual.
For all the passengers on our nation's roads, the loss of protection from
an individualized suspicion standard is difficult to overstate. Justice Kennedy
understood the implications of the Court's rule:
The distinguishing feature of our criminal justice system is its insistence
on principled, accountable decisionmaking in individual cases. Ifa person
is to be seized, a satisfactory explanation for the invasive action ought to
be established by an officer who exercises reasoned judgment under all the
circumstances of the case.314
Justice Kennedy then connected Wilson with Whren, noting the cumulative
impact of these two cases:
The practical effect of our holding in Whren, of course, is to allow the
police to stop vehicles in almost countless circumstances. When Whren
is coupled with today's holding, the Court puts tens of millions of
passengers at risk of arbitrary control by the police. If the command to exit
were to become commonplace, the Constitution would be diminished in a
most public way.15
Add Robinette into the mix and, suddenly, citizens in the passenger seat could
find themselves pulled over for someone else's minor traffic violation,
314. Id. at 890 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
315. Id.
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ordered out of the car for no reason, and questioned about items as exotic as
guns or drugs. The invasions caused by the combination of Wilson, Whren,
and Robinette are now an ever-present reality on our roads. Such a precipi-
tous erosion of Fourth Amendment rights was wholly unnecessary because the
simple tool of reasonable suspicion stood ready to aid officers in determining
the dangerous from the innocent.
1 6
Further, Wilson's careless reasoning muddied other Fourth Amendment
issues. Chief Justice Rehnquist's flat assertion that the only change suffered
by passengers ordered out of a vehicle is that "they will be outside of, rather
than inside of, the stopped car," is based on silent assumptions inconsistent
with an entire line of case law defining Fourth Amendment seizure." 7 In
California v. Hodari D.,3"8 the Court confronted with the issue of whether a
person was seized during a police foot pursuit." 9 Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, concluded that an arrest (seizure) of aperson occurs with "either
physical force ... or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of
authority."32° Stepping out of a vehicle pursuant to the command of a uni-
formed officer who has pulled the car over by lights and sirens clearly
constitutes the passenger's submission to police authority. It is a seizure
according to law crafted by the Court as late as 1991. However, since Chief
Justice Rehnquist has deemed that the only difference visited upon the pas-
senger by Wilson is a change in location in reference to the car, logic dictates
that the passenger was also seized before he was commanded out of the
vehicle.
Such a conclusion flies in the face of other, equally current, seizure-of-
the-person precedent. For example, in Florida v. Bostick police approached
a bus passenger as he remained seated during a scheduled stop. 2' The Court
determined that such police-citizen contacts do not automatically constitute
seizures even though the individual, wishing to remain to continue his ride on
the bus, may not feel "free to leave."3" The confinement an individual feels
in a bus cannot be charged to police, because it is not caused by official
conduct, but by the person's desire to fulfill his own business - to be on the
bus when it departs.3"
316. Id. Justice Kennedy noted: "As the standards suggested in dissent are adequate to
protect the safety of the police, we ought not to suffer so great a loss." Id.
317. Id. at886.
318. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
319. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 623 (1991).
320. Id. at 626.
321. Floridav. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991).
322. Id. at 435-38.
323. Id. at 435-36.
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It could be argued that, like the bus passenger in Bostick, Wilson could
not be considered as "seized" simply because he was in a stopped vehicle.
Indeed, the state court envisioned passengers as perfectly free to abandon the
driver and hail a cab. 24 Further, Justice Stevens echoed this logic: "The
passengers [in the lawfully stopped car] had not yet been seized at the time
the car was pulled over, any more than a traffic jam caused by construction
or other state-imposed delay not directed at a particular individual constitutes
a seizure of that person."3"
It is doubtful that Chief Justice Rehnquist meant (by his cavalier state-
ment that an order-out only changes a passenger's location) to revisit the
definitional boundaries of seizure of the person. Judge Moylan would tell us
as much because he cautioned against investing too much in judicial language
falling outside of the holding. 26 Of course, this points to the very problem.
When it comes to weighing individual rights, the Court is all too ready to
carelessly minimize the interests at stake." Thus, a thoughtless and all too
malleable balancing analysis has replaced the concrete protections of
individualized suspicion.
V Conclusion
Imagine yourself as a passenger in a car, unaware that the driver is
speeding. Perhaps you have taken special care over your hair or suit because
you are about to make a presentation at a business meeting, seek a loan, or
meet your new boss. Or possibly, you hold a delicate item in your lap: a
flower arrangement for a friend or a birthday cake for your child's party.
Maybe you simply have spent the better part of a quarter of an hour getting
yourself situated just right so that you no longer feel that chronic back pain,
or you have just gotten comfortable after stowing away your wheelchair.
These concerns, albeit minor to anyone else, are the cares of everyday life.
However, when the police light flashes behind you, they lose all value.
324. State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 1, 10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 882
(1997).
325. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 889 (1997).
326. Wilson, 664 A.2d at 6-7.
327. See, e.g., Vemonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386,2393 (1995) (finding
"privacy interests compromised" by school coaches and teachers who compelled urinalysis of
student athletes as "in our view negligible"); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444,451 (1990) (finding sobriety checkpoint's "intrusion on motorists" to be "slight"); Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,626-27 (1988) (comparing forced urinalysis
of railroad employees akin to "regular physical examination"); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (describing "additional intrusion" on driver ordered to exit his vehicle as
"de minimis"); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976) (characterizing
intrusion caused by checkpoint as "quite limited").
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Regardless of the inclement weather outside, the splashing of the passing
cars, the fragility of the gift on your lap, or even the pain in your back, an
officer has an absolute right to order you out of the car. This is so even if you
exhibit no signs of danger to the officer's safety. Indeed, it is true even if you
are completely innocent of any wrongdoing. Simply because of your unlucky
choice in drivers, you have lost control over one of the most basic freedoms:
the location and movement of your body.
There was a time when the Court itself was aware of the enormity of the
individual right implicated by seizures of the person: '"No right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable author-
ity of law." '328 However, the sanctity of this basic right has recently been
threatened. Chief Justice Relnquist, the author of the majority opinion in
Wilson, had previously labeled the motorist's freedom from random seizures
as: "only the most diaphanous of citizen interests." '329 The short shrift that he
gave to the individual's interests in his Wilson balancing analysis demon-
strates that the Chief Justice considers the passenger's rights equally
lightweight. Therefore, since the right of the citizen is insignificant, espe-
cially in light of the government's ever important safety goals, it can be
balanced away. In fact, it can even be dismissed as "minimal.
3 0
Even if the Court's dubious diminution of Wilson's seizure interests
were somehow accepted as accurate, its characterization of Trooper Hughes'
actions would still fail to address a crucial Fourth Amendment concern: How
can the Court tolerate any unjustified invasion of constitutional dimension,
however "minimal"? The balancing process, in understating the individual
interests at stake, equates small with nonexistent. By participating in such
sophistry, the Court has failed to heed a basic lesson embedded in its own
precedent: any seizure, even one "limited in magnitude" compared to other
invasions, is still "constitutionally cognizable," and therefore must meet the
basic Fourth Amendment mandates. 31
In the past, the Court's vision was more acute, because it could recognize
intrusions upon individuals even smaller than the intrusion in Wilson. In
Brignoni-Ponce, the Court was able to discern the potential of "unlimited
interference with [motorists'] use of the highways" stemming from stops
328. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Union Pac. R.R Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,
251 (1891).
329. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 890, n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 650 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
330. Wilson, 117S. Ct. at886.
331. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661.
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lasting "no more than a minute" and occurring only in certain geographic
regions of the country.332 Curiously, the Court failed to recognize similar
dangers arising out of the seizure in Wilson, even though it was potentially
longer in duration and subject to strike anywhere in the nation.
Moreover, the unreviewable discretion that the Court built-in to the
Wilson prerogative will impose its daily burden much more on the innocent
than on the guilty. Quite simply, the vast majority of people on our roads are
"innocent citizens." '333 Wilson, by viewing each exit demand to a passenger
in artificial isolation, distorted the cumulative impact of its rule on law
abiding individuals: "[C]ountless citizens who cherish individual liberty and
are offended, embarrassed, and sometimes provoked by arbitrary official com-
mands may well consider the burden to be significant." '334 It is this aggrega-
tion of "thousands upon thousands of petty indignities" that the Wilson Court
undervalues.335 In so doing, it underrates the Fourth Amendment itself.
332. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880, 882 (1975).
333. Id. at 882.
334. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 888 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
335. Id.
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